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‘Pushing Through’ in Plato’s Sophist: A New Reading of the Parity Assumption1 
ABSTRACT 
At a crucial juncture in Plato’s Sophist, when the interlocutors have reached their deepest 
confusion about being and not-being, the Eleatic Visitor proclaims that there is yet hope. 
Insofar as they clarify one, he maintains, they will equally clarify the other. But what 
justifies the Visitor’s seemingly oracular prediction? A new interpretation explains how 
the Visitor’s hope is in fact warranted by the peculiar aporia they find themselves in. The 
passage describes a broader pattern of ‘exploring both sides’ that lends insight into 
Plato’s aporetic method. 
1  A Pattern of Exploring Both Sides 
2  The Context: Being and Not-Being as Exhaustive Alternatives 
3 A Warranted Sense of Hope 
Plato’s Sophist is puzzling. It is ostensibly about defining the sophist yet, after numerous 
attempts, embarks on a lengthy tangent about being and not-being. Past interpreters have 
mined the initial definitions for insight into the method of division,2 while those who focus 
on the central discussion of being and not-being tend to be concerned with what we can 
learn about Plato’s metaphysics and philosophy of language.3 But there are important 
methodological and epistemological lessons to be drawn from the way in which the 
                                               
1 I am very grateful for the feedback I have received on several drafts of this paper. Thanks to Emily Kress, 
Huw Duffy, George Rudebusch, and William Altman for comments on earlier drafts and to the participants of 
the Dublin Workshop on the Aporetic Tradition at Trinity College, the Reasoning and Inquiry in Ancient 
Philosophy Workshop at the University of Chicago, the Ancient Philosophy Works In Progress group at New 
York University, and the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy. Many thanks to Susan Sauvé Meyer and to 
two anonymous referees as well for a thoroughly helpful process that significantly improved the paper. And 
special thanks to Rachel Barney, David Charles, Ken Winkler, and Verity Harte for their advice and 
encouragement starting from the project’s early stages.  
2 For recent examples, see Devin Henry’s “A Sharp Eye For Kinds: Plato on Collection and Division”, and 
two papers in David Charles ed. Definition in Greek Philosophy: Lesley Brown’s “Definition and Division in Plato’s 
Sophist” and Mary Louise Gill’s “Division and Definition in Plato’s Sophist and Statesman”. 
3 For example, Blake Hestir’s Plato on the Metaphysical Foundation of Meaning and Truth, Paolo Crivelli’s Plato’s 
Account of Falsehood: A Study of the Sophist, and Allan Silverman’s The Dialectic of Essence: A Study of Plato’s Metaphysics. 
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discussion of being and not-being proceeds. I will argue that Plato draws attention to these 
insights with a key claim, the so-called ‘Parity Assumption’. As it turns out, this claim can 
only be properly understood when we see how it is justified by the method of the preceding 
discussion. A consistent methodological focus, then, is at least one respect in which the 
dialogue is more unified than it may at first seem.  
The dialogue’s main speaker, the Eleatic Visitor, kicks off the apparent digression 
into being and not-being by raising a puzzle: their seventh attempt at defining the sophist 
has relied on her ability to make things appear and seem which in fact are not. She also makes 
real statements that are nevertheless not true (236c9–237a1). But these observations appear 
to assume that not-being, in a way, is. In doing so they raise the very specter that the great 
Parmenides, a fellow Eleatic, vehemently warned against (237a2–b3). Hence the problem: 
the current definition of the sophist runs afoul of Parmenides’ injunction against claiming 
that not-being is. Yet, if we follow Parmenides’ advice, then the sophist will once again elude 
our grasp. The interlocutors decide to examine this claim more closely along with contrasting 
claims about being. This spawns a series of additional problems. But before those problems 
are eventually resolved and just when they appear most damaging, the Visitor makes a 
striking announcement that has received less attention than it deserves. 
His announcement, the Parity Assumption, suggests that the interlocutors should 
hold out hope despite their present confusion. Their problems concerning both being and 
not-being will be resolved together; in clarifying one they will also clarify the other. G.E.L. 
Owen recognized the importance of the announcement and was the first to label it the ‘Parity 
Assumption’.4 But neither he nor any interpreter since has explained what justifies this 
seemingly oracular prediction.5 I will argue that the Parity Assumption is not in fact an 
                                               
4 Owen 1970, 229–31. The next statement from 251a1–3 is equally important, however, so I will consider this 
as part of the Parity Assumption as well. 
5 There has been surprisingly little discussion of the claim since Owen. All Bluck says in his commentary is: 
“the solution will be similar in both cases” (1975, 106). McCabe, too, follows Owen’s interpretation (McCabe 
1994, 207). Thomas distinguishes between a strong and a weak version of this type of reading: on the strong 
version a given solution must clarify one just as much as the other, on the weak version that solution must clarify 
both sides to some degree, but can do so to different degrees. She endorses the weak version (2008, 651). While 
Crivelli generally pays very close attention to the arguments in the surrounding context in his 2012 book, he 
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assumption as has been supposed; it is a well-motivated expectation that arises out of the 
very structure of Plato’s aporetic method. In fact, the Visitor himself calls it an expectation 
rather than an assumption: 
The Parity Assumption6 
V. Then indeed let this stand as containing a serious source of puzzlement; and since both 
being and not-being alike have had their share of puzzlement, already at this point there is 
an expectation that insofar as one of the two shows up as either more obscure or clearer, the 
other too shows up similarly. And if in turn we are not able to see either one of them, we 
will in this way push the account through both at the same time, however we are able to do 
so most appropriately.  (250e5–251a3)7 
Taken as a mere assumption, the Parity Assumption provides only a forward-looking 
prediction about the joint illumination of being and not-being in the positive resolution to 
follow. I will offer a new reading, however, that shows how it has something quite important 
to tell us about the preceding discussion as well. The passage contains Plato’s self-conscious 
description of a method that I call ‘exploring both sides’ as it is employed throughout the 
discussion of being and not-being. 
 Exploring both sides is a method that Plato introduces most explicitly in the 
Parmenides, when he has Parmenides recommend exploring the consequences of both a 
                                               
does not even mention the Parity Assumption. The greatest exception is Notomi’s article ‘Plato on What is 
Not’, which contains an in-depth discussion of the claim (though he prefers the term ‘joint illumination’). He 
helpfully emphasizes the importance of the end of the passage from 251a1–3 and points out an affinity to the 
method employed at 251dff. (2007b, 268), but like those before him still suggests that the same solution will 
feature in resolving both the problems with being and those with not-being (2007b, 262). I will take Notomi’s 
lead in emphasizing the final lines of the passage as well as connections to the immediate context, but will 
suggest a different reading of its main force.  
6 Despite its being misleading, I will keep the traditional label so as not to bias the case in favor of my view. I 
simply ask the reader to keep in mind that, on my reading, the Parity Assumption is not in fact an assumption. 
See §3 below for a more detailed discussion of my translation along with the Greek text. 
7 All translations are my own, based on the most recent OCT Greek edition of the relevant text or Diels-Kranz 
in the case of Parmenides’ fragments. 
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hypothesis and its contradictory (135d7–136a2).8 Owen recognizes that the Parity 
Assumption has “obvious affinities” with this recommendation but does not pursue the lead 
any further (1970, 231). Yet this connection reveals something very interesting about the 
structure of the conversation in the Sophist. The Eleatic Visitor employs this technique of 
systematically considering a series of exclusive and exhaustive claims throughout the 
discussion of being and not-being. This procedure leads to a serious impasse at the center of 
the dialogue, but also opens the way for the positive resolution. I will argue that this structure 
is what justifies the Parity Assumption, which draws our attention to this very feature of the 
discussion. 
 I will focus on two sets of puzzling questions about the Parity Assumption that my 
account can help us to answer. First, what is the best way to understand the expectation for 
the joint illumination of being and not-being, and why is it said to follow from their present 
aporia? On the standard interpretation, it is simply assumed that joint illumination will 
proceed by the solution to one set of problems (either those with being or those with not-
being) helping to resolve the other set of problems as well. On this view, the focus is on 
clarifying being and not-being as separate notions or concepts. I will argue, however, that 
being and not-being are understood at this point of the dialogue as involving exclusive and 
exhaustive claims about reality.9 The expectation is that understanding the truth or falsity of 
each claim will go hand in hand (since they are exclusive and exhaustive, one must be 
understood to be true, the other false). On my view, this expectation does in fact follow from 
the very structure of exploring both sides in the preceding inquiry. It cannot simply be, as 
implicitly assumed by Owen and others, that the Visitor knows where the conversation is 
going or thinks that some general principle about opposites will do the trick.10 
 The following two questions are closely related on my reading as well: why is the 
Parity Assumption announced where it is, and why did the interlocutors even bother to 
                                               
8 For the suggestion that Plato employs this method specifically for testing first principles, see Vassilis 
Karasmanis’s “Dialectic and the Second Part of Plato’s Parmenides”. 
9 The claims in question are ‘not-being is’ and ‘being is’. See below for a defense of my reading as well as an 
explanation of why they are initially taken to be exclusive and exhaustive, a mistake corrected in the positive 
resolution of the dialogue.  
10 Thanks to Whiney Schwab for helping me see the dialectical importance of this contrast for my view. 
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discuss claims about being in the first place? After all, it was only the claim ‘not-being is’ that 
created difficulties for defining the sophist. The standard interpretation is hard-pressed to 
give a satisfying explanation. Someone like Owen might suggest that, since the proper 
understanding of being is related to that of not-being, it is worth trying one’s luck with being 
after they have reached a dead end with not-being. But in that case the appropriate time to 
announce the Parity Assumption would be when they initially encounter problems with ‘not-
being is’, not after they have already examined related claims about being. Again, I will argue 
that my new interpretation of the Parity Assumption fares much better. The Visitor 
recommends the examination of being as part of exploring both sides, informed by their 
Parmenidean heritage of seeing the claims ‘being is’ and ‘not-being is’ as two exclusive and 
exhaustive routes of inquiry. The Visitor waits to announce the Parity Assumption since it is 
only after the interlocutors have reached what I call a ‘well-motivated aporia’ produced by 
exploring both sides that they are justified in expecting joint illumination. 
 The key to a proper understanding of the Parity Assumption will be to see how it is 
justified by the method of the preceding conversation. Other interpretations cannot account 
for what else might warrant the Visitor’s otherwise baffling claim. Thus my focus is first and 
foremost on the proper interpretation of the Parity Assumption itself. I cannot do full justice 
to all of the complexities of the Sophist here, but I will discuss the structure of the preceding 
conversation since, on my reading, that very structure is what motivates the Parity 
Assumption. Therefore my interpretation of the actual method employed will provide 
independent support for my interpretation of the Parity Assumption along with its main 
justification. 
It will be worthwhile to first get a better sense of the pattern of Exploring Both Sides 
that the Parity Assumption describes on this new reading. This will be the focus of §1. In §2 
I address the second set of questions concerning the timing of the Parity Assumption, in part 
by emphasizing the Parmenidean heritage that is explicitly invoked. I then turn to a 
conservative analysis of the Greek text in §3 that helps answer the first set of questions 
concerning the Parity Assumption’s main force and scope. This all goes to explain how the 
Parity Assumption is more than a mere prediction and how it is in fact justified by the 
preceding discussion. 
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§1: A Pattern of Exploring Both Sides 
As mentioned above, exploring both sides is a method that Plato introduces most explicitly 
in the Parmenides but employs throughout the Sophist as well. It is especially useful in the 
Sophist for its ability to produce a well-motivated aporia and to encourage further inquiry when 
the investigation might have otherwise ended prematurely. 
A straightforward example of exploring both sides is Parmenides’ display in the 
Parmenides (136e5–166c5). Parmenides considers two exclusive and exhaustive claims: first 
that there is one, then that there is not one. In each case he explores the consequences of 
the claim in question with an eye towards which one is true.11 As I intend the label ‘exploring 
both sides’, the criteria for identifying an instance of the method are as follows: 
The pattern of exploring both sides involves: 
(a) a set of what are at least taken to be exclusive and exhaustive claims 
(b) an independent consideration of each claim 
(c) an aim of establishing which claim is true 
Condition (a) requires that the claims considered are taken to be exclusive and exhaustive. 
In that case the claims must be understood propositionally, but I use the term ‘claim’ 
advisedly. In the discussion leading up to the Parity Assumption, the interlocutors treat the 
available options as something akin to what we would call a proposition but without the 
same precision. Because they do not clearly distinguish between concepts and propositions 
in this portion of the dialogue, nor between sentences and their metaphysical correlates, the 
                                               
11 At 135c5–137b5 Parmenides explicitly recommends the very method he goes on to employ, and he makes 
clear that the method is aimed at discovering the truth. He begins by asking Socrates what he will do about 
philosophy (135c5) and continues with following exhortation: “Lift yourself up then and train more by what 
seems to be useless and is called prattle by the Many. [Do this] while you are still young: if you don’t, the truth 
will escape you” (135d3–6). After a detailed description of exploring both sides he again stresses that it is 
necessary “if you, practicing properly, are going to thoroughly see the truth” (136c4–5). Zeno underlines the 
point as well, adding that “without this wandering, detailed excursion through all things it is impossible to have 
understanding while hitting upon the truth” (136e1–3). Vasilis Karasmanis draws attention to the basic 
structure of this method (2012), which I describe in greater detail as the method of exploring both sides, and 
as distinct from Plato’s other hypothetical method(s), in my manuscript ‘A Long Lost Relative in the 
Parmenides? Plato’s Family of Hypothetical Methods’. 
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term ‘proposition’ runs the risk of importing distinctions that are not present, and perhaps 
even intentionally absent. This is an important point because it underlines a central difference 
between my interpretation and the standard interpretation.12 Note that condition (a) only 
requires that they are taken to be exclusive and exhaustive claims; as long as they are treated 
as such the method can lead to epistemic progress. On my view, this is in fact what happens 
with the alternative claims ‘being is’ and ‘not-being is’. The interlocutors initially treat them 
as both exclusive and exhaustive as they take Parmenides to have done, but come to realize 
in the end that this was a mistake. 
According to condition (b), each alternative claim must be considered in turn. Thus 
a simple disjunctive syllogism as represented by the following procedure will not count as a 
case of exploring both sides: 
1. A or B 
2. assume A 
3. show that C follows 
4. but, independently, not-C 
5. infer not-A 
                                               
12 I understand the subject of the Parity Assumption as what are taken to be two exclusive and exhaustive 
claims (‘not-being is’ and ‘being is’) rather than simple concepts or notions. That is to say, on my view, the 
subjects of joint illumination are such that they can stand in an exclusive and exhaustive relationship where one 
is viable while the other is not (as with the claims ‘there is one’ and ‘there is not one’ in the Parmenides).  This is 
not to rule out the idea that the interlocutors are thinking of the concepts of being and not-being as intimately 
related to the claims ‘being is’ and ‘not-being is’ at this point in the dialogue. Nor is it to rule out that Plato 
elsewhere distinguishes more clearly between concepts and propositions. In fact, I believe that an essential part 
of the dialogue’s positive resolution is to distinguish more clearly between several related claims about being 
and not-being and the notions themselves in the so-called ‘communion of kinds’ passage (251c8–259e7) as I 
will argue below. Only then do the interlocutors clearly distinguish the kind ‘not-being’ from the combination 
of the kind ‘not-being’ with the kind ‘being’ (the metaphysical correlate of the claim ‘not-being is’) or the 
combination of the kind ‘being’ with ‘not-being’ in relation to some third kind (e.g. the metaphysical correlate 
of the claim ‘being is not change’). This is no small development: one might initially think that the metaphysical 
correlate of ‘not-being is’ should simply be the kind ‘not-being’ rather than its combination with another kind. 
These problems are especially acute when it comes to forms of the verb ‘to be’; I discuss these issues as they 
appear in the Sophist as well as their Parmenidean background in sections 2 & 3 below. 
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6. conclude B  [disjunctive syllogism] 
An argument of this form does mention what are taken to be exclusive and exhaustive claims 
(A and B) but does not consider them independently, therefore does not meet condition (b). 
This condition highlights one important way in which exploring both sides can encourage 
further inquiry. In the Parmenides, for example, Socrates finds himself in trouble after 
Parmenides reveals a series of objections against his hypothesis concerning the existence of 
forms. Socrates appears about ready to give up, but Plato then has Parmenides make a 
curious move; he points out that someone who denies the existence of forms will be 
vulnerable to serious objections as well (Parmenides 135b5–c2). If they had stopped after the 
reductio of the first option, then Socrates might have thought he had good reason to abandon 
the project based on a simple disjunctive syllogism as represented above. But now they have 
a reductio against both sides, one for the claim that forms exist and one for the denial of that 
claim. A defeatist attitude no longer makes sense: further inquiry is needed to figure out 
which way to go. 
 This situation, where there are serious problems for each of a set of exclusive and 
exhaustive claims, I will call a ‘well-motivated aporia’. Below is a simple example with two 
claims (again, A and B). Note that steps 1–4 are identical to the disjunctive syllogism above, 
but in this case the inference ‘not-A’ is not drawn after step 4. This is because in this case 
steps 1–4 are part of a broader procedure for inquiring into whether A or B is true; ‘not-A’ 
would imply ‘B’ by disjunctive syllogism, but the inference is not yet drawn because the other 
side is yet to be explored. There may, after all, be a mistake somewhere in these first four 
steps. Steps 5–7 serve as a check on what has been found in 1–4 and are inconclusive: they 
license the inference ‘not-B’, but it conflicts with the available inference that follows from 
the previous steps. Thus no firm conclusion can yet be drawn and there is a well-motivated 
aporia: 
1. A or B 
2. assume A 
3. show that C follows 
4. but, independently, not-C 
5. assume B 
6. show that D follows 
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7. but, independently, not-D 
8. aporia  [well-motivated aporia] 
There is good reason to follow up a simple reductio with exploring the other side since one 
may unwittingly be in such a situation. And a well-motivated aporia itself calls for further 
inquiry, either by resolving the problems on either side or by what the Parity Assumption 
calls ‘pushing the account through’, revisiting the status of the alternative claims. It may be, 
for instance, that the initial assumption that A and B are exclusive and exhaustive is mistaken. 
The third condition for exploring both sides relates to the aim of the argument. For 
example, an argument by cases will meet the first two conditions but not the third: 
1. A or B 
2. assume A 
3. show that C follows 
4. assume B 
5. show that C follows 
6. conclude C  [argument by cases] 
In an argument by cases, the goal is to show that some conclusion (C in this case) follows 
no matter which alternative (A or B) is true. In exploring both sides, the motivation is to 
establish which alternative is true rather than some other conclusion that follows. A simple 
case of exploring both sides might look like this: 
1. A or B 
2. assume A 
3. show that C follows 
4. but, independently, not-C 
5. assume B 
6. show that D follows 
7. and, independently, D (or, at the very least, there is no support for not-D) 
8. all things considered, conclude B [exploring both sides] 
Note that steps 1–8 once again represent a process of inquiry rather than a simple 
demonstration or deduction. The conclusion, B, follows from 1–4 alone via disjunctive 
syllogism. Yet the whole idea of exploring both sides is to provide a check on such an 
inference; there could, after all, be serious problems on the other side as well. In this case, 
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exploring the consequences of B does not lead to additional problems and to a well-
motivated aporia. Steps 5–7 on their own do not license the conclusion deductively but, all 
things considered, B is the most reasonable conclusion at this stage of the inquiry. Exploring 
both sides does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion since there is always a possibility 
that something went wrong along the way. Here the fact that the other side does not appear 
to have any problematic consequences, however, lends further support for B. 
 There is a consistent pattern of exploring both sides in the discussion of being and 
not-being in the Sophist. More often than not it proceeds by first creating and then responding 
to a well-motivated aporia. A clear example arises in the so-called ‘Battle Between Gods and 
Giants’, part of the puzzle-setting section focused on being (245e6–249d5). The positions of 
the materialist Giants and the immaterialist Friends of Forms are eventually put in terms of 
change and rest, and the Visitor helpfully sums up one central argument as follows (their 
claims are initially taken to be exhaustive, but this is later revealed to be a mistake): 
 V. It follows then, Theaetetus, that if things are changeless13 then there is nowhere any 
nous14 for anything about anything. 
 T. Exactly.  
 V. And further, if in turn we agree that all things are borne and changing, also according to 
this argument we will remove this very same thing15 from the things that are.  (249b5–10) 
The Visitor begins this short passage by drawing a corollary from the preceding discussion, 
namely the contrapositive of the foregoing conclusion that if there is nous then there is change 
(248e7–b4). He uses the same verb that Plato’s character Parmenides used to describe the 
consequences that follow from a hypothesis (συ#βαίνω; Parmenides 136a1, Sophist 249b5). 
After highlighting how there can be no nous without change, he looks to the other side and 
                                               
13 Omitting the extra ‘)άντων’ in Duke et. al. along with Burnet and the manuscripts. 
14 I have left the Greek term ‘νοῦς’ transliterated since it is not obvious what the precise English equivalent is 
in this context. The term standardly refers to the virtue of intelligence or reasoning; Stephen Menn suggests 
the translation ‘reason’ in a helpful discussion of the term (1995, 14–18). In this context, however, it is not clear 
whether there being nous refers to forms having nous, individual souls having nous, the world itself containing 
some kind of rational order, or even its having nous in a world-soul as in the Timaeus. For present purposes, this 
issue will not affect our understanding of the argumentative pattern here. 
15 i.e. nous. 
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suggests that there can equally be no nous if all things change. In what follows the 
interlocutors independently follow out this line of reasoning (249b11–c9). 
The two alternative claims are ‘all things are changeless’ and ‘all things change’. It is 
clear that condition (b) is met since each claim is considered independently. The following 
lines make clear that it meets conditions (a) and (c) as well. The Visitor emphasizes how they 
must “fight with every argument” ()αντὶ λόγῳ #αχετέον) against someone who does away 
with nous, how a philosopher must not accept these consequences, and how they must be 
like a child asking for ‘both’ change and rest in response (249c6–d5). The first two points 
show that the interlocutors take the lack of nous to be a reductio rather than a positive 
consequence derived through argument by cases. The closing analogy to a children’s wish 
shows that they take the options to be exhaustive (even though this is a mistake that will 
soon be corrected). The interlocutors take themselves to be at an impasse whose resolution 
requires somehow moving beyond the confines of what is rationally acceptable, like a child 
insisting on two incompatible desires.16 This application of exploring both sides, then, leads 
to a well-motivated aporia. 
 While exploring both sides in this case does not immediately open the door to a 
positive resolution, it does help them identify where they went wrong. They soon come to 
realize that there is a third alternative of some change and some rest. Their initial mistake of 
treating ‘all things are changeless’ and ‘all things change’ as both exclusive and exhaustive 
highlights a central lesson of the dialogue.17 
                                               
16 Gill also draws attention to this passage, which she calls the ‘children’s plea’. On her view the point is to 
emphasize that a proper ontology needs to countenance not only stable entities and changing entities, but 
entities which exhibit both change and stability (2012, 18, 98–9, 205, 229–30). This is consistent with my 
reading, though I take the emphasis to be on the fact that the claims as presented are not exhaustive, rather 
than their not being exclusive.  
17 The distinction between opposites that are exhaustive and those that are not is explicitly set out and explained 
later on in the case of something being small as opposed to it being not-large (257b1–c4). See n.32 below for 
an elaboration of this point. 
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 This is just one small-scale example of the pattern of exploring both sides that the 
Parity Assumption draws attention to.18 Another can be found in the positive resolution. By 
this time, the interlocutors have learned their lesson and set out three genuinely exclusive 
and exhaustive claims. Unlike before, only two claims run into problems. The third remains 
as the beginning of a solution to their previous difficulties. 
The Visitor and Theaetetus set up this final application of exploring both sides as 
follows: 
 V. Well then, so that our speech may be directed towards everyone who has ever discussed 
being or anything whatsoever, let the present issues be addressed to them, as well as to as 
many others with whom we were previously discussing, in the form of a question. 
 T. What sort of issues, exactly?  
 V. Should we neither apply being to motion and rest nor anything whatsoever to anything 
else, but rather in this way posit these things in our accounts as unmixed and incapable of 
participating in one another? Or should we draw all of them into the same [account] as 
capable of partaking of one another? Or [should we say that] some are and others aren’t? 
Which of these, Theaetetus, will we say they would ever choose?  
 T. I at least am not able to answer on their behalf on these issues.  
 V. Why then don’t you answer one at a time, examining the consequences in each case?  
 T. That’s a good idea. (251c8–e7) 
Here the space of possibilities is divided into three alternative claims, either everything 
combines with everything else, nothing combines at all, or some things do while others do 
not. The claims are exclusive as implied by the Greek interrogative ‘poteron’ ()ότερον)19 and 
are genuinely exhaustive as well.20 The Visitor explicitly suggests that they explore each one 
independently, as they in fact do in the following conversation. They find that there are 
                                               
18 See the appendix for a diagram representing this pattern of exploring both sides throughout the discussion 
of being and not-being as I see it. It includes this application of the method in the Battle Between Gods and 
Giants (under the heading ‘type ontologies’ as well as the other applications mentioned below in the order that 
they appear in the dialogue. 
19 This word standardly introduces an alternative question as it does at the beginning of the Visitor’s second 
speech quoted above, but is often best left untranslated as I have done in this case. 
20 Hestir also notes that these are exclusive and exhaustive options (2016, 148). 
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unacceptable consequences for the first two claims, ‘all things combine’ and ‘no things 
combine’, but make positive progress in following out the consequences of the third, this 
time using not only the same verb but the same exact phrase for following out the 
consequences used in the Parmenides (σκο)εῖν τὰ συ#βαίνοντα, Parmenides 135e9–136a1, 
Sophist 251e5–6). From the beginning this is portrayed as a choice between three options, 
and they are clearly interested in which claim is true. Thus the general pattern of exploring 
both sides is realized here as well. 
 Not only does this argument meet the criteria for exploring both sides as defined 
above, but it also portrays itself as the continuation of a discussion begun earlier in the 
dialogue. The Visitor explicitly refers back to those “with whom we were previously 
discussing” and alludes to previous positions discussed.21 Similarly, in discussing change and 
rest he recommends that they do so “just as we questioned those others before” referring 
back to the discussion with the hot and cold dualists (249e6–250a7). There too the 
interlocutors explore what are taken to be exclusive and exhaustive claims, with the pluralists 
on one side and monists on the other. After reaching an impasse with count-ontologies they 
‘push through’ by formulating the claims based on the type or quality of beings rather than 
their number.22 
 On my interpretation, the Parity Assumption describes this very pattern of creating 
and responding to a well-motivated aporia and emphasizes the option of ‘pushing through’. 
The well-motivated aporia at the level of being and not-being is what justifies the Visitor in 
making the Parity Assumption. In response, the communion of kinds passage represents 
them ‘pushing through’ with a new set of alternative claims. 
                                               
21 For example, those who “apply being to motion and rest”, the focus of their inquiry just a few pages earlier. 
22 Again, see the appendix for a diagram that lays out the structure of the successive applications of exploring 
both sides. The type-ontologies are the Giants’ position that only what has touch and impact is (246a10–b1) 
and the Friends’ position that true being is knowable and bodiless forms (246b6–8), later summarized as ‘all 
things change’ and ‘all things are changeless’ as discussed above. Lesley Brown points out how the Visitor splits 
the positions about being into count- vs. type-ontologies (1998, 185). The first time we get a hint of this 
dichotomy, as Brown notes, is at 242c4–6 (τὰ ὄντα ... )όσα τε καὶ )οῖά ἐστιν) and it is emphasized again 
when they transition to the discussion of type ontologies at 245d12–246a2 (τοὺς δὲ ἄλλως λέγοντας αὖ 
θεατέον).  
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§2 The Context: Being and Not-Being as Exhaustive Alternatives 
Now that we have the structure of exploring both sides in front of us I will argue that this 
structure is in fact what is being described in the Parity Assumption. I will begin with the 
second set of questions from the introduction: Why is the Parity Assumption announced so 
late in the discussion of being and not-being? And why did the interlocutors even bother to 
discuss being in the first place? After all, it was only a claim about not-being that caused 
difficulties for defining the sophist. As far as the standard account is concerned, the Parity 
Assumption could have just as easily been announced immediately after the interlocutors 
encounter problems with ‘not-being is’. In fact, this is what one should expect on the 
standard interpretation of the Parity Assumption; if the reason for discussing being is to get 
clear on not-being, then shouldn’t the Visitor announce this before the discussion of being? 
 On my view, the Parity Assumption is not made earlier because only after they 
encounter problems with being have the interlocutors, especially Theaetetus, realized that 
there is a well-motivated aporia that needs to be dealt with. After finding unacceptable 
consequences on the side of not-being, someone like Theaetetus might think they are in the 
clear; assuming that the route of being is straightforwardly acceptable, they should simply 
reject not-being by reductio and stick with what they know. Only after Theaetetus has explored 
the other side and realized that he is in equal, if not greater confusion about being is there a 
deep problem that needs to be addressed. 
 This highlights an important difference between the standard interpretation and my 
interpretation about what it means for one side or the other to be clear. On the standard 
interpretation, the relevant sense of illumination or being clear is properly understanding a 
concept such as being or not-being. On the flip side, a concept is unclear when there are 
problems with understanding the concept (as there turn out to be for both being and not-
being). The progression of the discussion on the standard view is as follows: (1) the 
interlocutors find problems with and are thus unclear about not-being, (2) the interlocutors 
find problems with and are thus unclear about being, (3) the Parity Assumption announces 
that clarifying one with clarify the other. On my interpretation, however, the interlocutors 
are discussing what they take to be exclusive and exhaustive claims: a view of reality that 
includes not-being, characterized by the claim ‘not-being is’, and one that does away with 
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not-being, sticking with the claim ‘being is’.23 Unlike a concept, a claim is unclear when one 
is unsure whether to accept or reject it. That is to say, it is clear either when one is sure that it 
should be accepted or when one is clear that it should be rejected. On my view, then, the 
progression of the conversation is somewhat different: (1’) the interlocutors find problems 
with ‘not-being is’ but, assuming that there are not analogous problems with ‘being is’, are 
initially clear that they should reject the former claim and accept the latter; (2’) the 
interlocutors nevertheless a) explore the other side, b) find that there are in fact problems 
with this alternative claim as well, and c) are thus in a well-motivated aporia, uncertain about 
whether to accept or reject either claim; (3’) the Parity Assumption announces that clarifying 
whether or not to accept one claim will clarify whether or not to accept the other. This 
explains why the announcement of joint illumination in the Parity Assumption comes after 
(2): this is the first time they fully come to realize the lack of clarity in their present position. 
 In the next section we will see exactly why the structure of their well-motivated aporia 
justifies an expectation for joint illumination.  First, a closer look at the preceding discussion 
confirms that the discussion of being and not-being uses the method of exploring both sides 
to create a well-motivated aporia. Conditions (b) and (c) from the previous section are clearly 
met: claims about being and claims about not-being are examined independently and with a 
direct interest in the claims themselves. Condition (a) is less obvious: do the interlocutors 
really take these claims to be exclusive and exhaustive? The progression of the discussion 
and the explicit Eleatic background show that they do. 
 The Eleatic background in the Sophist is hard to miss. The Visitor is introduced as 
coming from Elea and as a follower of his fellow Eleatics Parmenides and Zeno (216a3). He 
then kicks off the discussion that leads to the Parity Assumption by directly quoting 
Parmenides’ poem: 
 V. This account has dared to assume that not-being is; for falsity would not have come 
about in any other way. The great Parmenides, son, maintained steadfastly starting from 
when we were children and through to the end, speaking on each occasion both in prose 
and in meter:  
For this won’t ever be tamed, he says, that not-being is  
                                               
23 See n.28 below for more detail on what is entailed by each of these claims. 
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rather you must withhold your thought from this route of inquiry  
It is testified then by him, and if tested in due measure the account itself most of all should 
make it clear. Let’s look at this then first, unless you somehow disagree.  
 T. As far as I’m concerned, posit what you like. As for the argument, examine yourself 
where it goes through best and lead me down that route. (237a2–b6) 
Here the Visitor draws attention to their own implicit assumption that not-being is, one that 
the ensuing aporiai will reveal as problematic.24 He underlines the point by bringing in 
Parmenides’ injunction against the position and with it the context of Parmenides’ poem 
itself. 
At least on one interpretation of Parmenides’ poem, Parmenides sets out two 
exclusive and exhaustive ‘routes of inquiry’ (ὁδός διζήσιος, fr. 2.2, 6.3, 7.2)25 related to being 
and not-being respectively.26 The metaphor of a physical ‘route’ (ὁδός) fits best with thinking 
of these in terms of exclusive and exhaustive claims where there is a forced choice between 
one route or the other.27 And the very same language is vividly repeated in the Sophist. In the 
above quote, after the Visitor recites Parmenides’ injunction to stay away from the “route” 
                                               
24 This highlights another striking parallel with the Parmenides, further supporting the idea that the method of 
exploring both sides is relevant to the Sophist as well. The Visitor uses the same language of hypothesis here 
found in the description of exploring both sides in Plato’s Parmenides (ὑ)οτίθη#ι, 135e9, 136a2). Furthermore, 
the Parmenides explicitly recommends applying the method to this very position when he elaborates on the 
method a few lines later: “And the same account applies to dissimilarity and to change and rest and generation 
and destruction and to being itself and not-being” (Parmenides 136b4–6). Here he specifically mentions not-
being along with a list of other ‘greatest kinds’ also discussed in the Sophist (254d4ff). Given the procedure as 
recommended in the Parmenides, one of the hypotheses addressed would be ‘not-being is’. 
25 The relevant line of fr. 7 is in fact quoted at Sophist 258d3. 
26 On one standard interpretation, the first route is explored primarily in the first two thirds of fragment 8 
(though also in fragments 3, 4, and 6) and the second route primarily in the last third of fragment 8 and 9–15 
(though also in fragment 6). See also the end of the first fragment for the injunction to learn the opinions of 
mortals in addition to the truth about reality. 
27 Alexander Mourelatos is explicit that he understands the two routes as exclusive and exhaustive in his The 
Route of Parmenides (1970, 71). In Chapter 2 and Appendix 2 he argues that each route should be understood as 
a “sentence frame” of the form ‘__ is __’ and ‘__ is not __’ respectively. Cf. n.28 below. 
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of saying that not-being is (ὁδοῦ, 237a9), Theaetetus asks him to “lead me down this route” 
(ὁδόν, 237b6). Later, after the Visitor indicates that he might be switching sides, he uses the 
same language to refer to the other route: 
 V.  Come then, with what beginning should someone begin a daring argument?  For I think, 
boy, that we must absolutely take the following route. 
 T. [A route] of what sort? 
 V. First to review the things now seeming to be clear, lest we may somehow be in confusion 
about these things but recklessly agree with each other that we are in the right. 
 T. Tell me more clearly what you mean. 
 V. Parmenides seems to me to converse with us carelessly, as well as everyone who ever yet 
hastened toward a judgment of determining with respect to the things that are how many 
and what sort they are. 
 T. How so? (242b6–c7) 
Again, the Visitor suggests they “take the following route” (ὁδόν, 242b7), now referring to 
the alternative claim that being is.28 Furthermore, just before this the Visitor maintains that 
the only way out of their problems is either to agree with or to refute Parmenides’ account 
                                               
28 To be more precise, the interlocutors focus on corollaries of the claim ‘being is’ that aspire to give a complete 
characterization of reality excluding not-being. These claims consistently take the form ‘being is __’ or ‘__ is’ 
with ‘being’ occasionally replaced with some equivalent. For example: “the all is hot and cold or some two 
things such as this” (243d8–9); “the all is more than one” (244b3); “the all is one” (244b6); “being is some two 
things or only one” (245e1–2); “only that which yields some impact and touch is” (246a11–b1); “true being is 
some knowable and bodiless Forms” (246b7–8); “the beings are nothing other than capacity” (247e4); “no 
beings change” (249b5); “all things are borne and changing” (249b8–9); “the all rests” (249d1); “being changes 
in every way” (249d2); “both [change and rest] are” (250a11–12). Compare this with Mourelatos’ interpretation 
of Parmenides using the sentence frame ‘__ is __’ mentioned in the previous note. This is analogous to the 
situation with not-being: there the claim ‘not-being is’ is thought to be required for the possibility of false 
appearance and false speech, which can only be accurately described with claims of the form ‘__ is not __’ (e.g. 
“what he said is not true”, or “even though it appears to be, the second line is not any longer than the first”).  
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(241d5–e6).29 This very dichotomy of two ‘routes of inquiry’ occupies the background of the 
entire discussion leading up to the Parity Assumption.30 
On the one side is the claim ‘not-being is’, as well as what are taken to be its 
corollaries: that falsity is possible and that being is not. On the other side is the claim ‘being 
is’, as well as its perceived corollaries: that falsity is impossible and that not-being is not. The 
former characterizes reality as including not-being, which is seen as the only way to 
accommodate falsity and claims of the form ‘__ is not __’. The latter follows Parmenides in 
excluding not-being from a complete characterization of reality, initially taken to exclude all 
falsity and only allow for claims of the form ‘__ is __’ (though the interlocutors will later see 
this as a false dichotomy). These claims are in fact a main focus throughout the discussion 
leading up to the Parity Assumption, even when it may seem as if they are talking about the 
meaning of the concepts ‘being’ and ‘not-being’ as assumed by the standard interpretation. 
For instance, Theaetetus describes their task in the discussion of being as “to track down 
being first, what in the world those talking about it think they are indicating” (243d3–5), but 
in the discussion that ensues they focus on metaphysical theses about the number and type 
of things that exist. Similarly, they ask the dualists in particular what they mean by ‘being’ in 
statements such as ‘being is two’ (243e2), but in answering this question focus on the truth 
or falsity of the position itself (cf. 243d8–9 & 245e1–2). 
In the discussion of not-being, too, they go back and forth between talk of not-being 
and of related claims. As we have seen, it is the hypothesis ‘not-being is’ that kicks off the 
discussion in the first place. The Visitor describes their discussion as ‘the refutation of not-
being’ (τὸν τοῦ #ὴ ὄντος ἔλεγχον, 239b2–3), only to later emphasize the same claim as 
before when he says: “the many-headed sophist has forced us to agree against our will that 
in a way not-being is” (… τὸ #ὴ ὂν … εἶναί )ως, 240c4–5).31 
                                               
29 Palmer’s considered view in Plato’s Reception of Parmenides is that Plato takes this to be a sophistic appropriation 
of Parmenides. But even if it is not Plato’s own preferred interpretation it still plays a central role here. 
30 See also 240e1–2, where ‘not being is not’ and ‘not being is’ are portrayed as alternative claims as introduced 
by the Greek interrogative ‘)ότερον’. 
31 The position is similarly emphasized at 237c7–8, 238a8–9, 238c5–6, 239b7–10, 240e1–241a1, 241b1–3, 
241d6–7, 246a1–2, 254d1–2, 256d11–e5, 258b7–261b3 and even in the Statesman (284a7–8). In many of these 
latter instances the related position ‘being is not’ is also emphasized. 
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This all goes to show that condition (a) is indeed met; the interlocutors take 
themselves to be dealing with two exclusive and exhaustive claims. Yet one might still 
wonder: if it is important for understanding the method here that the interlocutors are 
engaged with what they take to be exclusive and exhaustive claims, why all the confusion? 
Why do they not acknowledge more clearly and explicitly what they are up to? First, on my 
interpretation the Parity Assumption does in fact acknowledge the structure of their inquiry 
in a self-conscious fashion, as does the Visitor’s claim about needing to discuss being to 
avoid mistakenly thinking that they are in the clear (quoted on p.17 above). But it is also 
important to emphasize that what is depicted in the Sophist is a circuitous process of inquiry, 
one that that explores various positions rather than straightforwardly laying out a single view. 
Along the way, the interlocutors develop more precise ways of speaking. The confusion in 
the discussion of being and not-being is part of the point: it shows how certain 
misconceptions can cause problems and how a proper inquiry can reveal and resolve them. 
The idea that ‘being is’ and ‘not-being is’ are exclusive and exhaustive claims is one of these 
very misconceptions. Plato has Socrates highlight the possibility of this type of 
misconception with his opening premonition that the Visitor is “some elenctic god coming 
to observe and refute us as careless in our way of speaking” (216b5–6).32 
                                               
32 There are many examples of an initial lack of regimentation early in the discussion that is corrected by the 
end of the dialogue. For instance, the interlocutors frequently confuse the difference between contraries and 
contradictories before the issue is clarified at 257b1–c4. In the first definition of the Sophist they mistakenly 
infer from the fact that he is not a layman that he is a complete expert (221d1–6). The same mistake is made 
even more explicitly at 240b5 and again at d6–8 where the Visitor says that not-true is the contrary (ἐναντίον) 
of true, only later to assert that negation does not signify a contrary (ἐναντίον, 257b9). The very same mistake 
leads to the final aporia just before the Parity Assumption, where they assume that not changing implies rest 
and not resting implies change, leaving out the possibility that something may neither change nor rest (250c12–
d3). In the discussion with the monists and pluralists, the interlocutors rather haphazardly contrast the position 
‘being is one’ with ‘being is two’, leaving out other pluralist positions (see e.g. 245d12–e1). The distinction 
between finite and infinite pluralities is only made later on at 252b1–6 and is important because the argument 
against the dualists will not work against someone who posits an infinite plurality. Another salient example 
comes in the fifth definition of the sophist, where the final distinction is between those who argue on either 
side for pleasure and those who do so for profit. The latter is identified as sophistry, whereas the former is 
called ‘prattle’ (‘ἀδολεσχική’). This division again is not exhaustive, as there may very well be other aims rather 
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The Visitor himself is explicit that he is wary of giving a straightforward display of 
his views. Socrates leadingly asks him whether he would like to go through the issue on his 
own or via question and answer “just like I did with Parmenides when he used question and 
answer, going through quite fine arguments when I was young and he was much older” 
(217c1–7). Socrates recommends the young Theaetetus, thus recreating the dynamic of the 
conversation with Parmenides that he alludes to (as depicted in Plato’s Parmenides, another 
hint that the methodology of exploring both sides is indeed relevant to the Sophist). The 
Visitor agrees and says he would be ashamed to give the impression of offering a display 
(ἐ)ίδειξιν, 217e2). Instead, he consistently describes their conversation using the language 
of inquiry.33 This is not to say it is a joint inquiry between equals: the differences in age, 
experience, and position are significant.34 But there is nevertheless a clear emphasis on the 
epistemic progress being made by the interlocutors coming to realize their own ignorance 
and then overcoming it.35 
                                               
than pleasure or profit. Interestingly, the very same word for prattle is used in the Parmenides to describe how 
exploring both sides is seen by the many (ἀδολεσχία, 135d5). This is yet another important methodological 
connection with the Parmenides that suggests we should be on the lookout for exploring both sides in the Sophist 
as well.  
33 Starting at this very point, the Visitor and Theaetetus talk of examining (σκέ)το#αι/σκε)τέον/σκέψις: 35 
occurrences), searching (ζητέω/ζήτησις: 17 occurrences), testing (βασανίζω: 2 occurrences), and hunting 
(θηρεύω/δυσθηρευτός: 5 occurrences; #εταδιώκω/#εταθέω: 3 occurrences; διερευνάω: 3 occurrences). 
The only use of ‘ἐ)ίδειξις’ is the one just quoted, characterizing what the Visitor hopes to avoid. The cognate 
‘ἐ)ιδείκνυ#ι’ is used twice to describe the sophist’s practice (230b7 & 234b9) and only once to refer to the 
Visitor and Theaetetus’ discussion when they display their results at the end (265a1). 
34 Theaetetus is portrayed as a young man who is likely encountering many of these arguments for the first 
time, whereas the Visitor has been through similar arguments before (217b5–9). For example, the Visitor 
realizes their confusion about being before Theaetetus does (249e2–5). Later in the dialogue the possibility of 
their talking past one another is made particularly salient when the Visitor and Theaetetus realize that they have 
different interpretations of Theaetetus’ answer to a question (261d6–262b3). 
35 For these reasons, I find it slightly misleading when Frede, Brown, and Hestir claim that the Sophist is atypical 
in its relation to Plato’s own views. Frede calls the Sophist “the most dogmatic of all of Plato’s dialogues” (1996, 
135) and Brown calls it “markedly didactic” (2008, 438), both suggesting in their respective pieces that we can 
be more confident that Plato’s own views are to be found in the Visitor’s words (see also Hestir 2016, 107). I 
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The modest epistemic progress of first realizing what one doesn’t know is explicitly 
highlighted throughout the discussion and is one of the motivating factors behind exploring 
both sides. After encountering the problems with not-being and some cautious repositioning 
on the Visitor’s part,36 he opens the discussion of being “to review the things now seeming 
to be clear, lest we may somehow be in confusion about these things but recklessly agree 
with each other that we are in the right” (242b10–c2, also quoted on p.17 above).37 This 
trope of unwittingly being in ignorance is familiar from elsewhere in Plato, but also from 
earlier in the discussion of the so-called ‘noble sophist’ (229c1–6, 230b4–5). Being refuted 
so as to realize one’s own puzzlement is there characterized as a purification of no small 
importance (230d7–e4). Here the Visitor merely flags the possibility that they are in such a 
position, but he suggests this more emphatically after the first aporia about change and rest: 
 V. Oh blessed one, don’t you notice that we are now in the greatest ignorance about 
[being],38 though appearing to ourselves to have something to say? 
                                               
agree that the dialogue takes a strikingly different approach from many of Plato’s elenctic works in the way that 
it begins and ends, but it is important not to lose sight of the thoroughly elenctic and aporetic nature of the 
initial discussion of being and not-being in particular. Through exploring both sides, the interlocutors offer 
refutations of what are taken to be exclusive and exhaustive claims that lead to well-motivated aporiai. This 
shows that the language of inquiry highlighted above is not a mere pretense, but is still consistent with the idea 
that the positive solution contains views about false statement that the author himself wishes to endorse. 
36 The Visitor asks Theaetetus’ lenience on three counts. First he asks that Theaetetus welcome even the 
slightest improvement of their present impasse (241c7–10), second that he not take the Visitor to be a parricide 
by taking on Parmenides’ account in their own self-defense (241d1–242a4), and finally that he not take the 
Visitor as crazy for turning back and forth at every step (242a5–b5). All three requests make good sense on my 
interpretation where the interlocutors are about to embark on a project of exploring both sides, one that will 
require taking both sides seriously as well as testing them rigorously, and that will require patience with what 
may be only incremental improvements.  
37 Again, this makes little sense as a motivation for discussing being on the standard interpretation. On this 
view, the reason is to clarify not-being, not to confirm whether they are clear about being. But, as I have 
suggested, checking to see whether an apparent reductio is in fact just one half of a well-motivated aporia is in 
fact part of exploring both sides. On my view, then, the Visitor’s avowed motivation makes perfect sense.  
38 Literally the text reads ‘it’ (αὐτοῦ), but the pronoun refers to ‘being’ (τὸ ὄν) at 249d7. 
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 T. I think we have something to say; I don’t entirely understand how, in turn, it has escaped 
our notice that we are in this state. (249e2–5) 
Theaetetus here is somewhat hesitant to embrace the thought that they are in fact in such 
confusion about being. Yet after one final attempt at making sense of the claim ‘both change 
and rest are’, Theaetetus finally admits that they may be even more puzzled about being than 
about not-being (250e1–4). The Parity Assumption comes immediately afterwards, 
warranted by the interlocutors’ full realization of the problems with each of their alternative 
claims. The overarching strategy of the discussion of being and not-being, then, is to raise 
problems with the seemingly clear side of being in order to motivate the resolution of the 
difficulties with not-being as well. 
 Up to this point exploring both sides has made modest epistemic progress by helping 
the interlocutors see that they are confused even where they thought they were in the clear. 
And only at this point, when they have explored both sides and found problems with each, 
can the Visitor genuinely express the hope of the Parity Assumption. 
§3: A Warranted Sense of Hope 
 Now we can address the first two questions about the Parity Assumption: what is 
the best way to understand the prediction of joint illumination, and why is it said to follow 
from their present aporia? Rather than seeing it as a mere assumption, understanding the 
claim as a genuine expectation warranted by the structure of exploring both sides will help 
answer these questions. It will also resolve a series of key interpretive puzzles that have been 
overlooked by the standard account. The central advantage of my interpretation is that it 
explains these features of the Parity Assumption, most importantly its justification based on 
the preceding discussion, that the standard interpretation is hard-pressed to accommodate. 
The Visitor announces the Parity Assumption just after Theaetetus admits that they 
might be in even greater confusion about being than about not-being. It is worth going over 
my translation once again along with the Greek for a more detailed understanding of what 
the announcement really entails: 
 The Parity Assumption 
 Ξ. Τοῦτο #ὲν τοίνυν ἐνταῦθα κείσθω διη)ορη#ένον· ἐ)ειδὴ δὲ ἐξ ἴσου τό τε ὂν καὶ τὸ #ὴ 
ὂν ἀ)ορίας #ετειλήφατον, νῦν ἐλ)ὶς ἤδη καθά)ερ ἂν αὐτῶν θάτερον εἴτε ἀ#υδρότερον 
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εἴτε σαφέστερον ἀναφαίνηται, καὶ θάτερον οὕτως ἀναφαίνεσθαι· καὶ ἐὰν αὖ #ηδέτερον 
ἰδεῖν δυνώ#εθα, τὸν γοῦν λόγον ὅ)ῃ)ερ ἂν οἷοί τε ὦ#εν εὐ)ρε)έστατα διωσό#εθα39 
οὕτως ἀ#φοῖν ἅ#α. 
 V. Then indeed let this stand as containing a serious source of puzzlement; and since both 
being and not-being alike have had their share of puzzlement, already at this point40 there is 
an expectation that insofar as one of the two shows up as either more obscure or clearer,41 
the other too shows up similarly. And if in turn we are not able to see either one of them, 
we will in this way push the account through both at the same time, however we are able to 
do so most appropriately.42  (250e5–251a3) 
Three interpretive issues arise when giving a translation of the text, each of which provides 
a constraint on an adequate reading. The first is how to understand the language of clarity 
and obscurity, that is the talk of the way that something might “show up” (ἀναφαίνω), of 
its being “clearer” (σαφέστερον) or “more obscure” (ἀ#υδρότερον), and of the possibility 
of not being able to see (ἰδεῖν). The second is how to understand the present tense of the 
verbs meaning ‘show up’ in the Greek, which implies that they will do so simultaneously. The 
third is how to translate the final clause, which Duke et. al. emend in order to fit better with 
the standard interpretation established by Owen. My interpretation provides a preferable 
explanation for each of these otherwise puzzling aspects of the passage. 
When it comes to the language of clarity and obscurity, past interpreters have taken 
the word ‘show up’ (ἀναφαίνω) in a positive manner to mean ‘come to light’. They then 
read ‘clearer’ and ‘more obscure’ adverbially, indicating different degrees to which something 
might come to light. This appears to be Notomi’s reading, for instance, when he translates: 
“if one of these will turn up, whether faintly or clearly, the other will also turn up in this way” 
(2007b, 258) and similarly Owen “if one of them can be made out to a greater or less degree 
                                               
39 Printing ‘διωσό#εθα’ with the manuscripts and with Burnet rather than the emendation ‘διακριβωσό#εθα’ 
of Duke et. al. See below for details. 
40 Taking ‘νῦν’ and ‘ἤδη’ together (cf. ἤδη II in the LSJ).  
41 Taking ‘ἀ#υδρότερον’ and ‘σαφέστερον’ as predicate nominatives with ‘ἀναφαίνεσθαι’ (cf. ἀναφαίνω 
II.2 in the LSJ). 
42 Taking ‘ἐυ)ρε)έστατα’ adverbially (cf. Symposium 198d6). 
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of clarity the other can be made out to the same degree” (1970, 229).43 Yet my translation 
stays closer to Plato’s use of these terms. ‘Show up’ does not have the positive valence of 
something becoming clear and unproblematic as ‘coming to light’ does; in fact, it can describe 
an appearance that is deeply obscure and problematic.44 On the other hand, ‘clearer’ clearly 
has a positive valence and ‘more obscure’ a negative one.45 Thus the two comparatives, rather 
than qualifying the degree with which something might come to light, suggest it becoming 
either clear and unproblematic in a positive way or obscure and problematic in a negative 
way. As a result, they are best translated as predicate nominatives rather than adverbs, hence 
my translation: “if one of the two shows up as either more obscure or clearer, the other too 
shows up similarly.”46 
On Owen and Notomi’s reading the passage only says something about when one 
of the two sides becomes clearer. But if we stick with the standard meanings of the 
                                               
43 While Notomi’s translation is less explicit on this point than Owen’s, it is clear from a later paraphrase that 
this is how he understands it: “if one of the two is made clear, the other becomes clear as well” (260). 
44 The clearest evidence for this point is just a few lines above, where being is said to have ‘shown up’ 
(ἀνα)έφανται) outside of both change and rest even though this is the ‘most impossible of all things’ (250c9–
d4). Another clear case where there is no such positive valence is Republic 487b7. There Adeimantus is objecting 
to an argument Socrates has just made by saying that people often feel that, despite agreeing to a series of 
questions, they have been led astray little by little until “the opposite of what they said before shows up” 
(ἐναντίον τοῖς )ρώτοις ἀναφαίνεσθαι). This appearance contains a contradiction and so the word must not 
have a positive valence here. The word is used three times elsewhere in the Sophist. Twice it simply refers to 
where the sophist showed up in one of the divisions (224d2, 231d8) and once to the way in which not-being 
appeared in the positive solution (260b8). None of these have an explicitly positive valence either.  
45 Elsewhere in Plato the word ‘obscure’ (ἀ#υδρός) has a strongly negative valence. In Republic X Socrates 
suggests that something not being that which is, but being like it, will turn out to be an ‘obscure’ matter 
(597a10). In the Timaeus the receptacle is introduced as an ‘obscure’ and difficult kind (49a3). And in the 
Theaetetus, wax in the soul that becomes ‘obscured’ as a result of being too soft gives rise to indistinct perceptions 
(195a). It is implausible to understand the word adverbially here to mean ‘clarify more obscurely’ as others 
have.  
46 While I prefer the predicate nominative construction, my interpretation is still consistent with taking the 
comparatives adverbially. In that case I would translate: “insofar as one of the two shows up in either a more 
obscure or a clearer manner…”  
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terminology in question, it also says something about when one side becomes more obscure. 
But why would there be a parity in both their clarity and their obscurity? This suggestion makes 
perfect sense given the background I have argued for, where we are considering what are 
taken to be exclusive and exhaustive claims that are clear to the extent that one should be 
accepted or rejected. Two exclusive and exhaustive claims have a special relation to one 
another: if you are clear about accepting one you should be equally clear about rejecting the 
other. And if you are unclear about whether to accept or reject one, you should be equally 
unclear about whether to accept or reject the other. There will indeed be this dual sense of 
parity when dealing with such claims: either a clear sense that one claim is to be accepted will 
be accompanied with a clear sense that the other should be rejected, or there will be a well-
motivated aporia where there are significant reasons against either accepting or outright 
rejecting either side. This is precisely where the interlocutors find themselves at the time of 
the Parity Assumption: they are in a well-motivated aporia where they want to accept that 
not-being is in order to properly define the sophist, but have heeded Parmenides’ warning 
and encountered serious problems. They also want to accept that being is but, to their 
surprise, have found equal if not greater problems on that side as well. What the Parity 
Assumption initially offers is hope that, just as they have observed both sides become unclear 
in tandem, the two will become clear in tandem as well. Further inquiry may still be 
worthwhile.47 
                                               
47 I do not want to overstate my disagreements with the standard interpretation. My view is consistent with the 
view that one important aspect of the conversation is getting clear on the kinds ‘being’ and ‘not-being’; this 
much is clear given the positive advances in the communion of kinds passage, not least the analysis of not-
being as difference. But what the standard interpretation misses is the consistent interest in different claims 
about being and not-being that are taken to be exclusive and exhaustive, an important structural feature of the 
conversation that justifies the Parity Assumption. Part of the positive work being done by the communion of 
kinds passage is precisely to distinguish between the kind itself (something akin to a concept) and its 
combination with other kinds (something akin to a proposition or state of affairs, the metaphysical correlate of 
a claim). A view that positively denies that exploring both sides plays any role here would have to explain away 
the instances of exploring both sides as discussed above (see also the diagram in the appendix) and give an 
alternate reading of the Parity Assumption that explains how the claim about simultaneous joint illumination or 
obfuscation is justified by what comes before. 
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 This same observation resolves the second interpretive puzzle. On the standard 
reading, the point of the Parity Assumption is that the very solution to one set of problems 
will resolve the other set as well. But the present tense of the verb ‘show up’ in both of its 
occurrences (‘ἀναφαίνηται’ and ‘ἀναφαίνεσθαι’ in the Greek) is puzzling if this is what the 
Visitor means. The moods and tenses of the two verbs constitute a present-general 
conditional where the mutual clarification is implied to be simultaneous.48 But how is it, for 
instance, that clarifying the problems with being would simultaneously clarify those with not-
being? Heindorf emends the second occurrence of the present-tense verb to the future so 
that it constitutes a future-more-vivid conditional instead, more consistent with the idea of 
two separate clarifications.49 But the text as it stands makes perfectly good sense when read 
in light of the unique structure of exploring both sides. Reasons for accepting one of two 
exclusive and exhaustive claims are equally reasons for rejecting the other; the clarification 
of the other side will be automatic without any need for a separate application. 
Interpreters have also been tempted to emend when it comes to the final issue of 
what the visitor means by “pushing the account through”. I have opted for the more 
conservative route of keeping the text as it stands rather than emending.50 On any construal 
                                               
48 See Smyth 2336b. 
49 The future, of course, would indicate future action in this context (Smyth 2326). Both present-general and 
future-more-vivid conditionals begin with ‘ἐάν’ + subjunctive in the protasis (or in this case, ‘καθά)ερ ἄν’ in 
place of ‘ἐάν’; cf. καθά II in the LSJ). The only difference in form is that present-general conditionals use the 
present tense in the apodosis and future-more-vivid conditionals use the future (Smyth 2297, Goodwin 397). 
50 I have given the same construal of the grammar as Notomi and Owen, originally suggested by Campbell. 
Campbell takes ‘λόγον’ as the direct object of ‘διωσό#εθα’ and reads ‘ἀ#φοῖν’, referring to the pair of being 
and not-being, as a genitive governed by the δια- prefix. While ‘διωθέω’ often means ‘fend off’ (e.g. Herodotus 
Histories 8.3, Isocrates Antidosis 320) it can also mean ‘push through’ (Timaeus 68a1, Xenophon Cyropaedia 7.5.39, 
Hippocratic De morbis 2.30). In the latter cases the accusative direct object is the thing through which the subject 
is pushed, but there are other cases where the accusative direct object is the thing pushed with ‘δία’ + gen. to 
indicate the thing through which it is pushed. Campbell cites such a parallel in Polybius (Historiae 21.28.14) but 
there is a closer parallel in Xenophon: “οὐ διέωσαν διὰ τῆς κόρης τὰς χεῖρας” (Hellenica 2.1.8). The only issue 
is that ‘δία’ is repeated in these cases unlike in the Parity Assumption. While the prefix does tend to be repeated 
in prose (Smyth 1654) this is not always the case. For instance, in the Timaeus Plato uses the verb ‘διαβιάζο#αι’ 
with the genitive and without repeating the prefix to describe air being forced through the veins: “τῶν φλεβῶν 
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that retains the text as is, there is a question about what the Visitor might mean by the 
relatively rare verb I have translated ‘push through’ (διωθέω). Yet the Duke et. al. version 
avoids this question by changing the verb. In explaining their decision to emend, Robinson 
reports being so persuaded by Owen’s interpretation of the previous lines that, even though 
he admits that the text is grammatically possible as it stands, he thinks it preferable to change 
the verb to ‘make accurate’ (διακριβόω) so that the Visitor essentially repeats what he said 
above (1999, 153–5). The more conservative option is preferable on purely paleographic 
grounds, and again makes perfectly good sense on my interpretation.  
 On my reading, this final line describes what should happen if both sides remain 
obscure. After all, it is perfectly possible that the interlocutors will not be able to make 
progress by clarifying either side of their well-motivated aporia. Maybe what is needed is a 
new way of understanding the alternative claims in the first place; perhaps there is another 
claim that avoids the Scylla of one and the Charybdis51 of the other (as the interlocutors 
found with ‘all things change’ and ‘all things rest’), or perhaps there is an entirely new way of 
dividing up the options (as in the transition from count ontologies to type ontologies). This 
is how I read the point about not being able to see: if joint illumination fails, if both sides 
remain ‘more obscure’, it is worth trying to push through to a new way of conceiving the 
alternative claims in the first place. This is precisely what the interlocutors do in the 
communion of kinds passage.52 
                                               
διαβιαζό#ενον” (84d6). Another equally viable alternative would be to emphasize the middle voice of 
‘διωσό#εθα’ and translate “we will push ourselves through the account of both” (thanks to Marko Malink for 
this suggestion). As for ‘ἀ#φοῖν’, Cornford cites the same word at 226a8 to support his translation ‘with both 
elbows’, but it certainly need not mean this as it clearly does not in the dialogue’s three other cases (243e1, 
246c6, 248b3). Alternatively, it could be taken as a dative of interest, hence ‘for both’ instead of ‘of both’ or 
‘through both’. While nothing here can decide the issue definitively, I prefer the latter reading since it fits best 
with the way in which the alternative claims are re-envisioned in the ensuing discussion. 
51 Campbell, Owen, and Notomi all draw attention to this potential allusion. 
52 This contains the most regimented application of exploring both sides in the Sophist (discussed on p.12 
above). The interlocutors have learned their lesson and explore three alternative claims that are genuinely 
exclusive and exhaustive: all kinds combine with one another, no kinds combine with one another, or only 
some do. 
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One final point worth noticing, and one that is equally hard to account for on the 
standard interpretation, is that the Parity Assumption is said to follow since (ἐ)ειδή) they 
have been in aporia about being and not-being. The standard interpretation focuses only on 
the forward-looking implications of the Parity Assumption and lacks any resources to explain 
why this might be the case. But the preceding context does indeed justify an expectation for 
joint illumination. The interlocutors have reached a well-motivated aporia through exploring 
both sides, and the very structure of this aporia suggests that becoming clear on whether to 
accept or reject one claim will thereby clarify the other as well. 
The hope brought about by their well-motivated aporia is twofold. The fact that both 
sides became unclear in tandem, that in both cases they were unsure whether to accept or 
reject the relevant claims, lends further support for the idea that they are in fact exclusive 
and exhaustive. And if they are exclusive and exhaustive they will be clarified in tandem as 
well. This is a hope, not a guarantee, because the claims as presently construed may not allow 
for clarification. The need may arise to push through their initial division to a new way of 
understanding (as they in fact do).53 
 On behalf of the standard interpretation, however, one might worry that the labels 
‘being’ and ‘not-being’ as used in the passage do not represent the right entities to be involved 
in a well-motivated aporia. If my interpretation were right, the worry goes, then why does the 
Visitor fail to specify at this point that the alternatives are ‘not-being is’ on the one side and 
‘being is’ on the other (along with their corollaries)? I grant that the Visitor is not being as 
precise as he could be, though suggest that this is part of the point. We have already seen 
how the preceding discussion inherits a Parmenidean understanding of being and not-being 
as representing two exclusive and exhaustive routes of inquiry, an understanding that they 
ultimately reject. Owen himself makes another off-hand comment that supports this idea: he 
suggests that “historically, [the Parity Assumption] is the appropriate reply to Parmenides” 
(1970, 231). Owen does not elaborate any further, however my interpretation does explain 
                                               
53 The Greek conjunction ‘ἐ)ειδή’ can also have a purely temporal sense and may alternatively be translated 
‘after’. Even if one reads the clause temporally we can still ask why the Visitor specifies that the expectation of 
parity comes only after their present impasse. My account of why the Parity Assumption is justified by the 
preceding context helps explain why the Visitor would explicitly draw attention to the timing here (in addition 
to the reasons offered in the previous section).  
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how to read this part of the Sophist as an appropriate response. Parmenides took being and 
not-being as alternative claims that are exclusive and exhaustive, but the process of exploring 
both sides shows this assumption to be mistaken. 
 We also need to be wary of anachronism here. While it is not entirely uncomfortable 
for us to use ‘being’ and ‘not-being’ as shorthand for exclusive and exhaustive claims 
(however mistaken this may ultimately be), it may have been even less so for Plato’s 
contemporaries.54 Nowhere in the Sophist, at least not up until the Parity Assumption, do the 
interlocutors clearly distinguish between concepts and propositions. And given the 
Parmenidean context the two might not have been so clearly separated.  No clear distinction 
between concepts such as ‘being’ and propositions such as ‘being is’ is made in Parmenides’ 
poem either; after all, he famously says: “for the same thing is for reasoning and for being” 
(fr. 3).55 Our interpretation should be guided by the way the discussion actually proceeds in 
the aporia that the Visitor refers to. As shown in the previous section, there the interlocutors 
go back and forth between talking about ‘being’ and ‘not-being’ and related positions about 
being and not-being, while the focus throughout remains on the positions themselves. If the 
relevant sense of parity were meant to involve the concepts or notions alone, then it is not 
clear how this would follow from their previous conversation as the Visitor claims it does.56 
                                               
54 For a discussion of how Plato goes back and forth between discussing propositional and non-propositional 
entities as principles in the Republic, see Gail Fine’s ‘Knowledge and Belief in Republic V–VII’ p.99 n.28. David 
Sedley discusses an excellent, related example of how Plato’s conceptual geography differs from our own in 
‘Plato's Theory of Change at Phaedo 70-71’. He persuasively argues that Plato’s understanding of ‘ἐναντίος’, 
often translated ‘opposite’, is neither what we would call a contrary nor a contradictory. Rather it is what he 
labels a ‘converse contrary’ (2012, 155ff). 
55 Similar issues arise when interpreting the two routes in Parmenides’ poem, each of which is described with a 
subjectless and predicateless use of the Greek verb ‘to be’: simply ‘ἔστιν’ and ‘οὐκ ἔστιν’ respectively (see fr. 
2.3–5 and 8.2–16). Mourelatos argues that this bare ‘is’ collapses several uses of the copula that we would 
otherwise distinguish (1970, 58). He also suggests that Parmenides’ use of the participle ‘being’ is derivative 
from this bare ‘is’, a use that Plato could be harkening back to here in the Parity Assumption (1970, 53). 
56 Since ‘being’ (τὸ ὄν) is used interchangeably with other formulations such as ‘the all’ (τὸ )άν), the 
interlocutors are clearly not focused on establishing anything like the Fregean sense of ‘being’ (see especially 
242c8–243a1, 244b6ff, and 249d1–2). Hestir also catalogues fifteen different senses of ‘being’ that are in play 
here, (2016, 139–40). 
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Finally, a proponent of the standard interpretation would need to offer alternative 
explanations in response to the main questions we have been discussing so far: what justifies 
the Parity Assumption? why is it announced precisely when it is? what is the use of discussing 
being in the first place, and why should the Visitor expect joint illumination and obfuscation? 
I have argued that the standard interpretation falls short of satisfactory answers here, and the 
fact that my interpretation has a straightforward explanation in each case lends further 
support for reading the passage as I have suggested. 
Conclusion 
All things considered, then, the Parity Assumption is best understood along the lines I have 
suggested. It assumes a background of exclusive and exhaustive claims where there are 
reasons both for and against on either side. It suggests that the interlocutors’ well-motivated 
aporia offers a glimmer of hope: insofar as they get clearer on whether to accept or reject one 
side of the dilemma they will get clearer on whether to accept or reject the other side as well. 
And even if this fails they still have the option of ‘pushing the account through’. This 
interpretation is fully consistent with a conservative translation of the passage and explains 
otherwise puzzling features of the wording. And when interpreted in this way it makes good 
sense of the surrounding discussion as well. 
The structure it draws attention to is a pattern of exploring both sides that repeatedly 
encourages further inquiry when the interlocutors may have otherwise been inclined to give 
up. The discussion of being and not-being begins with an awareness of their implicit 
commitment to the claim that not-being is and the attendant problems that Parmenides 
himself highlighted. Rather than simply treating this as a reductio, they decide to explore the 
other side and articulate an alternative characterization of what is that excludes not-being. 
This involves the method of exploring both sides on a smaller scale, first with count 
ontologies (monists vs. pluralists) after which they ‘push through’ to type ontologies (the 
Giants vs. the Friends of the Forms). In the latter case, the claims ‘all things rest’ and ‘all 
things change’ run into problems, requiring the interlocutors to ‘push through’ once again to 
a position of some change and some rest. But even this position runs into a dead end, at 
which point they announce that they are equally if not more confused about being. It is only 
at this moment, when they have realized their deep confusion, that the Parity Assumption is 
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announced. And afterwards, one final attempt at ‘pushing through’ in the communion of 
kinds passage finally helps them out of their well-motivated aporia.57 
Thus the Parity Assumption is not a mere assumption or an oracular prediction. It is 
based on a genuine hope that they are entitled to even in the midst their present impasse. 
And ‘hope’ or ‘expectation’ is precisely the right word; there is no guarantee that they will 
find a way forward, nor even a guarantee that the way they have been conceiving the 
alternative claims will allow for it.58 But the inquiry so far has adopted the structure of 
exploring both sides, and that structure lends hope even in the face of a deep, well-motivated 
aporia. As we have seen, this is precisely the hope that the Visitor recommends in the Parity 
Assumption. 
 At the level of the drama, this insight encourages the interlocutors to continue in 
what does indeed end with a successful resolution of the aporia. At a more general level Plato 
is drawing our attention to the very technique of exploring both sides that he employs in the 
composition of the Sophist. Even when an application of the method runs into problems it 
creates a well-motivated aporia, one that is structured so as to provide a way forward. And 
what better dialogue to emphasize this than one concerned with distinguishing the 
philosopher from the sophist? This is at least one lesson we can learn about Plato’s 
methodology in the Sophist above and beyond the more obvious examples of collection and 
division. The entire dialogue shows methodological care and creativity that deserves our 
close attention. 
                                               
57 Again, see the appendix for a diagrammatic representation of the way the discussion proceeds through 
exploring both sides. 
58 Thanks to Katy Meadows for pointing out the important difference between a hope or expectation and a guarantee 
for the purposes of the Parity Assumption. 
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